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Since the onset of the economic crisis, parties in parliament (especially those in opposi-
tion) have found themselves faced with a dilemma: choosing between the need to cooperate
with the government in order to overcome the crisis and the opportunity provided by a
weakened government to stress their adversarial position so as to be more easily re-
elected and possibly get into power. What have they decided to do? The present contri-
bution introduces a collection of works exploring this dilemma in southern European
countries, by examining the opposition behaviour in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain;
and in the European Parliament.
Keywords: government; parliamentary opposition; consensus; economic crisis.
Introduction
The international financial crisis has hit Europe, especially its ‘periphery’,
remarkably hard, and has had deep consequences at the economic and political
levels. A series of works have explored and explained the public policy
reforms undertaken;1 others have examined the electoral costs of such a difficult 
situation.2 An important aspect that has not been addressed in the literature so far 
is the impact of the crisis on the level of consensus in parliament. This is striking,
given its importance in empirical terms: the lack of cooperation between parlia-
mentary party groups and the government has significant consequences in terms
of bills’ passage and legitimacy, and even in terms of government survival.
Theoretically, the question is also interesting: parties in parliament (especially
those in opposition) have found themselves faced with a dilemma: choosing
between the need to cooperate with the government in order to overcome the
crisis and the opportunity provided by a weakened government to stress their
adversarial position so as to be more easily re-elected and possibly get into
power. What have they decided to do? This is a crucial question, for which
there is no easy or intuitive answer.
The present contribution introduces a collection of works exploring this
dilemma in southern European countries, by examining the opposition behaviour
in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In so doing, we shall try to understand not
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only what kind of impact the crisis has had on the level of consensus in parliament
in the four countries mentioned, but also whether differences are observable
across cases. We choose also to focus on the European Parliament (EP). Although
there is not a clear government–opposition division across the EP, studies have
shown that MPs behave differently when their national party is ‘in government’
in the EU Council and Commission (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2006). This is par-
ticularly true for very relevant legislation or political deals that Council or Com-
mission leaders pressure their members of the EP (MEPs) to support. Thus, like
their counterparts in national parliaments, MEPs have found themselves under
two contrasting pressures induced by the crisis: a pressure for cohesion, caused
by the same sense of responsibility and state of emergency felt by the national
opposition parties; and a pressure for fragmentation across party groups and
countries. Therefore, we intend to explore the effects of the financial crisis in
both a national and a supranational context.
Consensus, the Crisis and the Opposition’s Choice
The degree of consensus in parliament is the result of two contrasting pressures.
One comes from the need of opposition parties to mark their position as distinct
from that of other parties. This is a pressure towards conflict, which pushes pol-
itical parties to signal their distance from the government’s policy positions. The
other is a force towards cooperation that comes from the need of government to
ensure large support for their policies, echoed by the opposition’s wish to take
part in the decision-making and influence policy decisions. In sum, consensus
in parliament is the result of the balance between a tendency towards conflict
and another towards cooperation. As a rule, the latter prevails: at national
level, an extremely high level of consensus in the lawmaking process has been
found in almost all the European parliamentary democracies (Andeweg, De
Winter, & Mu¨ller, 2008; Christiansen & Damgaard, 2008; Cowley & Stuart,
2005; Giuliani, 2008; Kaiser, 2008; M|u´jica & Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2006). This is
true to such an extent that parties generally are ‘in opposition, in the sense of
being out of government, but not necessarily in disagreement on a continuing
basis with government’ (Norton, 2008, p. 241). At supranational level, within
the EP, a similar pressure to choose between conflict and cooperation across
parties is visible. On the one hand, MEPs have incentives to act cohesively to
maximise their chances of being influential, or simply to pass legislation as
often an absolute majority is required. On the other, party lines, nationalities
and government–opposition dynamics are drivers of conflict. As observed in
national parliaments, however, cooperation prevails in the EP: on average,
about two-thirds of legislation is passed with the consensus of a ‘grand coalition’
composed of the European Popular Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists
(PES), and the Liberals.3
With the financial crisis, the opposition parties’ usual dilemma between con-
flict and cooperation has become particularly intricate. At the national level, the
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difficulty of borrowing for most European countries – and for some, the con-
ditions of the loan set by the European Central Bank (ECB), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) – forces governments
to make radical changes in their policies, notably in areas such as taxation, pen-
sions, labour policy, and the like. Austerity measures are by their very nature
unpopular and, as stated by classical economic voting theory, in bad economic
times voters are much more likely to withdraw their support for the government
(Healy & Lenz, 2013; Lewis-Beck, 1988). This ‘golden rule’ has not been dis-
proved by the current crisis: in 2011 we witnessed the fall of the incumbents
in all the main countries of southern Europe.4 As noted by Bosco and Verney,
governments are always ‘wrong’ in these critical situations.
The economic storm that has broken out in Southern Europe has shown that
when incumbents are ‘responsible’ – abiding by the agreements with the
external actors – they end up neglecting their voters’ demands ... On the
other hand, when incumbents avoid being ‘responsible’ and/or try to be pri-
marily responsive to their voters, they lose international credibility, with
dangerous consequences for the management of national sovereign debt
and hence for the economic health of the country. (Bosco & Verney,
2012, p. 133)
These two extremes are well-represented by the cases of Zapatero’s government
in Spain, on the one hand, and that led by Berlusconi in Italy, on the other. The
first fell because his voters felt betrayed, while the second had to resign because
he had not acted responsibly enough to ensure the required financial stability for
his country. The political opportunities of opposition parties in such a critical
scenario are thus conflicting: they have a choice between the need to cooperate
with the majority to influence the direction of far-reaching socio-economic
changes in order to overcome the crisis, and the chance to weaken a fragile gov-
ernment even further and possibly get into power if elections are held. While the
executive has to act responsibly, deepening the tension between its representative
and governing function in favour of the latter (Mair, 2011), the opposition parties
can often grant themselves the luxury not to.
A similar reasoning can be made at the supranational level. On the one hand,
the decisions taken at the EU level following the crisis are urgent, extremely rel-
evant and are the result of difficult negotiations between the member states, so
that theMEPs are inclined to act consensually for their country’s sake. In addition,
many of these decisions have been passed at intergovernmental level, out of the
traditional legislative procedure. As the literature shows, in many cases the EP
has acted as a competence maximiser (Farrell & He´ritier, 2007; H|e´ritier,
Moury, Bischoff, & Bergstro¨m, 2013; Moury, 2007), that is, it aims to maximise
its influence on the decision-making process. All these factors have encouraged
the EP to act cohesively, in order to ensure a quick and safe passage of these
measures and/or increase its influence on them. But on the other hand, the crisis
has also generated a strong pressure towards conflict. First, socio-economic
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measures and reforms taken in response to the crisis are very ideological and entail
considerable delegation at the EU level. As a consequence, they are likely to split
the EP across party lines (left/right and pro/anti-EU integration). Second, the
recent socio-economic measures entail very different costs and benefits for the
different member states according to whether they are creditors or lenders, or
whether they belong to the eurozone or not. Thiswould also promote new divisions
within the EP along geographical lines. As a consequence, we expect the dilemma
between conflict and cooperation also to be relevant within the EP.
Preliminary Research Hypotheses
Little is said in the existing literature about the possible conduct of parliamentary
parties given such an extreme quandary. Traditionally, consensus in parliament
has been thought to be affected by the characteristics of the political system in
which the opposition parties operate, such as the type of government, type of
parties and party competition and institutional resources (Duverger, 1951; Ober-
reuter, 1975; Pulzer, 1987; Sartori, 1966). Typologies of opposition based on the
mentioned systemic factors are still functional and effective, yet they rely on
models based on an ideal image of democracy that still exists in theory, but no
longer corresponds to the actual performance of political actors (Andeweg
et al., 2008; Cowley & Stuart, 2005; Giuliani, 2008; Kaiser, 2008; Mu´jica &
Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2006). Consensus in parliament has been proved to be affected
also by non-systemic variables such as the preferences of the political actors, the
characteristics of the legislation to be approved and, in particular, the policy area
involved (De Giorgi, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Jenkins, 2010; Rose, 1984;
Tsebelis, 2002).
What is particularly relevant in our case is that the opposition parties’ behav-
iour in parliament has been proved to be more adversarial on economic and social
policies, as parties are expected to represent different socio-economic interests,
while the highest level of consensus is usually found on matters of national inter-
est commonly affecting the whole electorate, such as foreign affairs and defence
(Rose, 1984). The idea that ‘policy determines politics’, that the nature of issues
entails distinct patterns of cooperation and conflict (Lowi, 1972; Wilson, 1980),
points to the relevance of issue-voting, which has an established tradition among
scholars of decision-making and roll-call voting (Clausen, 1973; Erikson, 1978;
Francis, 1967; Kuklinski, 1978; Miller & Stokes, 1963). Furthermore, the sal-
iency that parties give to different issues has an impact on their voting behaviour
in parliament (Carammia & De Giorgi, 2011; Mu´jica & Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2006;
Stecker, 2011): low issue salience suggests lack of attention from the public,
hence less incentive for political parties to compete. By contrast, the more a
party (and its electorate) assigns relevance to an issue, the more costly it will
be to behave consensually. Although the legislation presented by the govern-
ments to save their country from the worst effects of the financial crisis might
be considered as related to national interests, it is also clearly related to socio-
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economic issues and innately salient. Hence, we expect the level of consensus
between the government and opposition parties to decrease as the number of
socio-economic and salient policies discussed in parliament increases.
Moreover, as pointed out in the existing literature, the nature of parties con-
stitutes a crucial variable that also explains the behaviour of the opposition in
parliament (Duverger, 1951; Flanagan, 2001; Sartori, 1966). In particular, we
expect to find a significant difference between the so-called radical parties –
that is, parties proposing extreme societal changes which are usually perma-
nently in opposition – and the mainstream parties, with a more moderate
stance, which usually alternate in government. We expect this difference
between permanent and alternative opposition to play a crucial role in the
choice either to support or to oppose the economic measures proposed by the
governments. As a result, we expect to have two kinds of opposition:5 that of
the mainstream parties – that is, parties with government aspirations, which
are waiting to be called to replace the government in office in the near
future – will behave in a more cooperative way; while that of the parties per-
manently excluded from power will radicalise their positions in the legislative
arena even further.
In a similar vein, scholars have already worked on the impact of Euroscepti-
cism – and conversely of pro-European attitudes – on the government–opposi-
tion dynamics and party competition at national level (Hooghe, Marks, &Wilson,
2004; Sitter, 2001, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003) and on the voting behav-
iour in the EP (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). In normal times ‘virtually every
policy area is now affected to a greater or lesser extent by the EU ... National elec-
tions are still contested on the basis of policy choices, but policy choices are
largely decided in Brussels’ (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004, pp. 2–3). In this period
of crisis, this dynamic has been stressed even further. Since the outbreak of the
crisis, the EU has acquired a key influence in socio-economic policy areas and
has started recommending the measures that are to be approved by the national
governments. This has happened in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where
countries and banks were bailed out and the international lenders – the ECB,
IMF and the EC – set conditions for the loan; but also in Italy and more recently
in Cyprus. Recommendations tend towards an extremely quick reduction of
public debt or deficit, but also indicate a whole series of structural reforms.
Even in countries that have not been bailed out, the influence of the EC on the
budget draft is undoubtedly substantial. Thus, a clear trend has been registered:
an increase in the European influence over (or even a Europeanisation of) the
usually controversial sectors of social and economic policy. Given this, we
expect the traditionally pro-European parties to be more likely to cooperate
than before on socio-economic measures, because they follow the EU recommen-
dations/orders. Alternatively, we expect the Eurosceptic parties to have less
incentive than before to collaborate when the EU influences legislation.
Thus, although we expect a general decrease in the level of consensus after
the onset of the crisis (due to the rising number of salient and socio-economic
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policy decisions), we expect the net impact of the crisis on the opposition parties’
behaviour to vary significantly from one party to another. Since the onset of the
crisis, the mainstream and pro-European parties, which usually alternate in gov-
ernment, are expected to behave more consensually than they would have done
for similar policies in other circumstances. We expect the contrary to be true
for the radical parties. Obviously, these two hypotheses are closely related, as
parties that are permanently out of government tend to be more Eurosceptic
(Sitter, 2001; Taggart, 1998).6
While the first hypotheses apply to both national and European legislative
arenas, an additional hypothesis relates to the shift in time in the national
context. As stated above, austerity measures are by their nature unpopular and
so it is the government that has to implement them. In other words, during the
financial crisis the major opposition parties have a better chance of replacing
the incumbents in the case of new elections. This idea is consistent with the lit-
erature that economic and financial crises tend to lead to government instability
and termination (Browne, Frendreis, & Gleiber, 1986).7 The current crisis is no
exception. On the contrary, it has been the rule in nearly all the elections in
southern Europe since 2011 to punish the incumbent. Of all the national elec-
tions held in the last two years in the four countries under analysis, just one
has witnessed the victory of the incumbent: the Portuguese presidential election
in early 2011.8 The impact of the economic crisis on the political development of
southern Europe was clear and undoubtedly negative for the incumbents,
although this did not always mean a clear victory of the main opposition
parties. In fact, in several of the last elections, the incumbent parties’ loss did
not coincide with the official opposition’s gain as would normally have been
expected. In Greece, the electoral results were so confused that a further election
had to be called soon after that of May 2012. In Spain, despite the 15.1 per cent
of the total vote lost by the Spanish Socialist Party, the People’s Party increased
its own support by only 4.7 per cent (Bosco & Verney, 2012). In Italy, the situ-
ation was even worse for the centre-left coalition, which was expected to win
easily the election held in February 2013: in fact, the results led to the
absence of a majority in the Senate, and the centre-left Democratic Party (PD)
was forced to make a post-electoral grand coalition with the main centre-right
party, the Popolo delle Liberta` (PDL) of Silvio Berlusconi. It was only in Por-
tugal in the general election held in 2011 that the increase in the vote for the
centre-right PSD exceeded the incumbent socialists’ loss. However, even
given this variegated picture, the opposition’s opportunities in the case of elec-
tions are certainly higher than in normal times. Therefore, our final research
hypothesis relates to variation in time and across cases, within the same
period of crisis. We expect that the more the government is in jeopardy, the
greater the opposition’s incentives to fight rather than to support the executive.
In other words, we posit that, once the financial crisis has begun, the opposition
behaves in a more conflictual way when the government’s incumbency is at risk,
for instance, when it lacks a majority of seats in parliament or its popularity
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declines, and in a less conflictual way when it is not, that is, when elections have
just been held or technocratic governments, rather than true political competi-
tors, are in charge.
The (Economic and Political) Crisis in Southern Europe
We shall test our argument in the four southern European countries that experi-
enced the greatest pressure from the crisis: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.
Apart from their geographic proximity, these systems actually share controversial
features at both the political and economic levels:
On the political side, they have often been portrayed as systems character-
ised by weakly institutionalised party systems, whose electorates neverthe-
less show restricted electoral volatility, along with ideological voting and
extended political patronage. On the economic side, their structures
appear weaker than their Northern European counterparts, with uneven
economic developments typical of dual economies, large state economic
involvement and reduced social mobility. (Bellucci, Costa Lobo, &
Lewis-Beck, 2012, p. 470)
The sarcastic acronym PIGS – Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain9 – was in fact
created to identify those national systems characterised by economic and political
weaknesses in Europe. In recent years, those common features have actually led
to nearly the same political and economic outcomes: all four countries were hit
dramatically by the international economic crisis and had to face a period of pol-
itical instability at the same time.
Besides these general similarities, there are in fact important differences
between the four. In the course of 2011, the prime minister (PM) resigned and
the government was replaced in all four countries under analysis. However,
this outcome was reached in two different ways: through the call for new elections
and the victory of the parties that were previously in opposition in Portugal and
Spain; and through the replacement of the PM thanks to the formation of a new
parliamentary majority supporting the government without going to the polls,
in Greece and Italy. But the latter two governments had different destinies: on
the one hand, the new Greek executive led by Lucas Papademos lasted only a
few months and was followed by two general elections in rapid succession (in
May and June 2012), because the results of the first one did not allow the for-
mation of a stable government. On the other hand, the new Italian executive
led by the former EU Commissioner Mario Monti almost completed its parlia-
mentary term. Monti resigned in December 2012 and a new general election
was held in February 2013, opening a new (critical) political scenario that resulted
in the formation of a new government led by Enrico Letta and supported by a
grand coalition, for the first time in the history of the so-called second republic.
On the economic side, Greece was the first EU member state to accept the
bailout package, which was agreed with the ECB, IMF and EC in April 2010.
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The implications of this agreement were both economic and political. The vote to
approve the bailout package and the consequent austerity measures put the cohe-
sion of most parliamentary party groups to a serious test. Many MPs who voted
against the party whip, belonging to both the government party – the Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK) – and the opposition parties, were expelled. As
the economic crisis deepened and the government support kept declining, the
opposition parties had less and less incentive to support the government propo-
sals. When the midterm fiscal plan was presented to the parliament in June
2011, it was supported only by the PASOK. After a cabinet reshuffle, the PM’s
disastrous announcement of a referendum on the measures to be approved, and
ultimately his resignation, a new coalition was formed by the PASOK, the
main opposition conservative New Democracy (ND), and the radical right
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), at the end of 2011. But this solution was not
enough to avoid going back to the polls for too long. Since June 2012, Antonis
Samaras has been leading a coalition government supported by a composite
majority with PASOK, the democratic left-wing DIMAR and the conservative
ND (with a limited role in government).
Although the first months of 2013 in Italy seemed reminiscent of the political
impasse that Greece had to face between May and June 2012, the situation was
different. Bosco and Verney (2012) had actually predicted that ‘the electoral epi-
demic spreading in Southern Europe’ would have included ‘the growth of absten-
tion, increasing parliamentary fragmentation and the emergence of new political
forces, notably those expressing anti-party, extreme right-wing or even racist pos-
itions’ (p. 150). In the case of Italy, it was mainly the anti-party sentiment that led
to the fall of both the centre-right and centre-left coalition at the election held in
February 2013 and resulted in the rise of the Five Stars Movement (Movimento
Cinque Stelle) founded a few years earlier by the famous comedian and
blogger Beppe Grillo, whose list got more than 25 per cent of the votes. This
caused the absence of a clear majority in the Senate and thus difficulty in the
rapid appointment of a new coalition government. As noted above, the solution
was to form a government supported by an unprecedented grand coalition, com-
posed of the traditional political adversaries of the second republic – the centre-
left PD and the centre-right PDL – and the new Lista Civica led by the former PM
Mario Monti. From an economic point of view, Italy has never had to ask for a
real bailout, although it has been clear from the start that the executive led by
Monti following Berlusconi’s resignation had to follow an exact plan agreed at
European level in order to overcome the economic crisis that was seriously threa-
tening the country.
Although the economic situation in Portugal and Spain was (and still is)
worse than that of Italy, they seem to have acquired greater political stability
since the elections of 2011. In Portugal, after the parliament’s rejection of an aus-
terity package – the fourth in less than one year – the Socialist PM Jose´ So´crates
resigned and international lenders were called to the rescue in April 2011. After
that, the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the right-wing
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Democratic and Social Centre Party (CDS) obtained an absolute majority at the
general election held in June. Since that time, however, the new government led
by Pedro Passos Coelho has had to act according to the rules agreed at the time of
the bailout with the ECB, IMF and EC; the three main parties in parliament (the
Socialist Party [PS], PSD and CDS) had taken part in the negotiations and, like
the other countries rescued by the international lenders, it was the nation that
had made the commitment rather than a particular government (Mair, 2011).
In the Spanish case, the Socialist government implemented the biggest rede-
finition of the welfare state, including public servant wage cuts, freezing pensions
and limiting public debt at both state level and regional level. The new Popular
Party government, appointed after the resignation of the Socialist PM Jose´ Luis
Zapatero and the general election that followed, also implemented policies that
contradicted its ideological claims by raising income taxes. In both cases, the pol-
itical costs were very high.
So how have the opposition parties reacted to this dramatic situation in
southern Europe? Have they tried to behave ‘responsibly’ by cooperating with
the government in office, or have they stressed their adversarial position and
tried to benefit from the difficulties and low popularity of the leading parties?
In this comparative work we shall try to verify our research hypotheses about
the possible behaviour of the opposition in such a critical economic and political
scenario.
The Crisis in the European Parliament
As we know, the EP does not, strictu sensu, have one government and one oppo-
sition. But by including the EP in this study, we can further our study of the
impact of the crisis on parliamentary cohesion and consensus. As a matter of
fact, involving the EP represents a terrific opportunity for such an enterprise
from an empirical and theoretical perspective. Empirically, the measures taken
at the EU level – fiscal compact, six-pack financial regulations, measures such
as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) – are absolutely innovative in terms of policy relevance,
but also in terms of the process that led to the decision. Analysing the way in
which the EP has passed these extraordinary measures and the manner in
which it was able to act cohesively to hold the EU Council and Commission
accountable, when the measures needed no passage in parliament, is of funda-
mental importance to understand how EU democracy functions and its resilience
when faced with an unprecedented crisis.
Analysing the impact of the crisis on EP cohesion is also important from a
theoretical point of view. Many EU scholars (see Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix et al.,
2007) have observed that a large majority of the votes in the EP can be read in
terms of MEPs’ group affiliation, while only a minority of votes can be
explained along national lines. The same authors also observed a shift from
consensus to greater division across ideological party lines in the last decade.
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As a result, the question that arises is whether the crisis has strengthened this
process of ‘ideologisation’ of the EP, as the measures passed are clearly
ideologically marked; or whether it represents a new driving force towards a
divide across geographical lines. But more than an enlightening exercise for
EU scholars, the inclusion of the EP in this study enables us to check
whether the hypotheses made above on the basis of the literature on national
legislatures could also apply to the EP. As Hix noted, the EU is a political
system and hence it makes great sense to apply the literature developed at
the national level to the EU. In fact, the decisions to save the EU from the
worst effects of the crisis are of considerable importance, and hence MEPs –
particularly those from mainstream parties – might be motivated by the same
sense of responsibility and commitment as their national counterparts; on the
other hand, radical and Eurosceptic parties might feel an incentive to distance
themselves even further from the decisions taken by the mainstream parties in
government. From that perspective, the last contribution of this study considers
the MEPs to be under similar pressures as their counterparts in national
legislatures.
The Work to Follow
In the comparative work that follows, we shall examine the preliminary hypoth-
eses posited above through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the behav-
iour of the opposition parties in the four European democracies hit most
acutely by the crisis – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – and in the EP. Each
contribution will propose a combination of empirical data analysis and qualitative
process-tracking, in order to test the hypotheses and/or check for alternative
explanations as well as to understand the shift from consensus to dissent, or
vice versa, in the opposition behaviour.
Before proceeding, we must underline once more that the relevant political
differences among the four cases under analysis – above all, the characteristics,
duration and stability of the new governments and the ways that led to the for-
mation of the new executives themselves – do not allow the empirical investi-
gation of the government–opposition dynamics in these countries to be
identical. While the immediate elections in Portugal and Spain allowed the
voters to assign clear responsibility of the economic situation to the incumbents
and led to the victory of the main opposition parties, the technocratic parenthesis
in Italy and Greece prevented the electorate from giving the same clear judge-
ment and – together with further country-related factors that will be explored
in depth in the works to follow – contributed to the (nebulous) electoral
results that we mentioned above and, in both cases, the implosion of the party
system. As a consequence, while Portugal and Spain will allow us to test our
hypotheses and compare the results, Greece and Italy will be treated slightly dif-
ferently, as will the EP, given its different supranational nature.
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Notes
1. See, among others, Matsaganis (2011, 2012), Navarro (2012) and Royo (2012).
2. See, in particular, the whole Electoral Studies Special Symposium ‘Economic Crisis and Elections:
The European Periphery’, edited by Bellucci et al. (2012), and the South European Society and
Politics special issue ‘Elections in hard times: Southern Europe, 2010–11’, edited by Bosco and
Verney (2012).
3. Source: VoteWatch.eu for the seventh legislature.
4. It is only in Spain that elections would normally have been called just four months later; the Por-
tuguese, Greek and Italian governments were all close to their midterm point (the parliamentary
term is five years in Italy, but four years in Portugal, Greece and Spain).
5. As pointed out by Mair (2011), it seems that ‘governing capacity and vocation’ have become
characteristic of a fairly restricted group of parties that belong to the mainstream of the party
system and are able to offer voters a choice of government. On the other hand, the capacity of ‘rep-
resentation’, or expression of the people’s voice, when it has not moved completely outside the
legislative arena, has become the characteristic of a different group of parties. These parties con-
stitute the ‘new opposition’. They rarely govern, they are usually distinguished by a strong populist
rhetoric and, even if not equal to the anti-system parties of Sartori (1976), they share with those
parties a kind of ‘semi-responsible’, if not completely ‘irresponsible’, opposition. ‘In other
words, it is possible to speak of a growing divide in European party systems between parties
which claim to represent, but do not deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to rep-
resent’ (p. 14). In our opinion, this divide is crucial to the understanding of the government–oppo-
sition dynamics during the financial crisis, not just in southern European countries but in all
European democracies.
6. It is actually so hard to combine Eurosceptic stances with government ambitions that Eurosceptic
parties that want to become credible coalition partners frequently moderate their hostility to Europe
(Conti & De Giorgi, 2011; Costa Lobo & Magalha˜es, 2011).
7. This argument is clearly supported in Portugal, which had already experienced two financial crises
that pushed the country into requesting international financial assistance from the IMF in 1978–79
and in 1983–85. Those interventions, like the current one, triggered political instability and early
elections.
8. It has to be noted that, although the Constitution gives the Portuguese president quite a strong set of
powers, in practice the Portuguese presidents have tended not to use them. As they do not play a
direct role in the government of the country, they are therefore less likely to be held responsible for
its bad status by the voters.
9. At first, the initial ‘I’ referred to Italy, then it was linked to Ireland, and since that time sometimes a
second ‘I’ has been added: PI(I)GS.
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